Pacific Aid Map: 2025 Key Findings

Key Findings

• Pacific Islands aid falls to pre-pandemic levels amid steep lending contraction
• Australia holds the line despite aid retreat by Western donors
• Impact of USAID cuts overstated but compounds US reputational freefall
• China’s aid model grows more sophisticated with record grants and grassroots projects
• Strategic infrastructure spending booms as health and education support slides

Overview

Australia holds the line as global aid declines

The global development landscape faces a moment of profound upheaval as major donors, most notably the United States, sharply cut back on foreign aid. These reductions carry far-reaching consequences, not only for sustainable development in the world’s poorest countries, but also in the contest for influence between China and Western nations. The Pacific Islands face an especially uncertain outlook as the world’s most aid-dependent region, confronting both large development financing gaps and an aid landscape increasingly shaped by geopolitical competition.

Against such a backdrop, this eighth edition of the Pacific Aid Map presents five key findings that are critical to understanding the future of development and competition in the region.

First, the total amount of development support provided to the Pacific Islands region has fallen back to pre-pandemic levels. Official development finance (ODF) to the Pacific Islands fell to $3.6 billion in 2023 — a 16% decline from 2022 and the second consecutive year of record contraction. Beneath this topline trend, grant support has remained stable while loans have dropped sharply as the emergency financing extended during the pandemic receded (Figure 1).

Second, Australia’s dominance as the Pacific Islands’ leading development partner looks likely to insulate the region from the bulk of recent aid cuts. The United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and much of Europe are cutting foreign aid budgets. Australia, however, accounts for 43% of ODF to the region and has stabilised its post-pandemic support at a high baseline (Figure 2). Looking ahead, rising Australian infrastructure lending should provide an important offset to cuts by other partners, suggesting a broadly stable outlook for Pacific Islands development finance, in sharp contrast to the contractions expected elsewhere in the developing world.

Third, the Pacific Islands are far less exposed to USAID cuts than commonly assumed. Most US support to the region is delivered through protected Compact of Free Association Agreements, leaving a comparatively small footprint outside of these arrangements. Nonetheless, there are some acute impacts, particularly on vaccination and media programs. The cuts are also reputationally damaging for the United States, reinforcing perceptions of inconsistency and amplifying China’s diplomatic narratives about American unreliability.

Fourth, China’s engagement has stabilised after a prolonged decline in lending. Beijing has recalibrated its regional aid strategy, prioritising record levels of grant financing, a high volume of grassroots projects, and strategic large-scale initiatives. The legacy of China’s earlier loan-heavy approach remains visible as countries such as Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu face steep debt repayments for projects signed in the 2010s.

Finally, geopolitical competition has seen funding for infrastructure become the dominant theme across the region. While helpful, the region’s infrastructure gap remains large. Meanwhile, funding for human development sectors has declined. Education support is now near a 15-year low, raising concerns about the long-term foundations for the region’s development.

Taken together, these trends point to a Pacific Islands aid landscape that, while stable relative to other developing regions, faces a flat financing outlook dependent on a narrowing pool of partners. What was once described as a period of choice for Pacific Island governments appears to be giving way to an era of constrained options.

Analysis

1. Pacific Islands aid falls to pre-pandemic levels amid steep lending contraction

After two years of record contractions, Pacific official development finance volumes have returned to pre-pandemic levels. The decline has been driven by a sharp fall in lending to Papua New Guinea and Fiji, while grant support has remained stable across the rest of the region.

Total official development finance (ODF) to the Pacific Islands region fell to $3.6 billion in 2023 — a 16% drop from 2022 levels (Figure 3). This marks the second consecutive year of record contraction, as the last of the pandemic-era emergency financing exits the region. What was once an open question — to what extent the pandemic-era influx of support would be sustained — now appears largely answered. With the 2023 decline, ODF has effectively returned to 2018–19 financing levels.

The fall in aggregate ODF in 2023 was largely driven by major contractions in concessional and non-concessional lending. The total volume of loans disbursed to the region more than halved, falling from $1.8 billion to $813 million. Grant financing in 2023, however, remained slightly above its pre-pandemic level, with most Pacific countries seeing grant volumes on par with, or above, average levels from 2015–19. This stability has provided some cushioning amid worsening fiscal pressures, as many Pacific governments confront slower than anticipated growth and rising debt pressures.²

Fluctuations in aggregate development financing flows to the region have not played out uniformly across individual countries. Financing trends have diverged between the Pacific’s largest economies, Papua New Guinea and Fiji, and the rest of the region (Figure 4). Both countries received substantial loan financing during the pandemic but have exited the crisis period at different settling points. In Papua New Guinea, grant financing totalled $650 million in 2023, falling short of its inflation-adjusted 2015–19 average of $720 million. Yet loan volumes remain high, supported by Australian budget assistance, Asian Development Bank connectivity projects, and Chinese investment in the communications sector. Fiji, by contrast, received near-record levels of grant financing in 2023, while loan volumes fell well below historical averages.

For the region’s 11 economies that largely rely on grant financing, the picture has been stable. Total ODF to these countries has remained at around $1.4 billion over the past five years (Figure 4). However, this topline consistency masks considerable variation in the composition of flows and country-level support.

In 2023, less than 5% of ODF flows to these economies came in the form of loans — a decade low and less than half the 2015–19 average share of 11%. This trend reflects both the collapse of Chinese lending and a broader decline in appetite for loans amid rising debt risks. Importantly, grant financing, particularly for region-wide initiatives, has remained elevated, helping to offset the decline in lending.

At the country level, variability remains high. Samoa, Vanuatu, Palau, and Nauru all received less ODF in 2023 than their 2015–19 averages, while Kiribati and Tuvalu saw record annual inflows. In Kiribati, this increase was largely driven by Chinese infrastructure financing and equipment donations, whereas in Tuvalu it reflected increased Australian support in the lead-up to the Falepili Union announcement.

2. Australia holds the line despite aid retreat by Western donors

Sharp aid cuts by major Western donors have thrown the global development landscape into disarray. Australia’s dominant role in the Pacific Islands is likely to insulate the region from the worst impacts, resulting in a flat but fragile development financing outlook.

Since the end of the Pacific Aid Map 2023 data reporting period, the global aid landscape has seen considerable upheaval. The United States has announced an estimated $60 billion in cuts to its development program, including immediate freezes to project financing, signalling a sharp withdrawal from what had been the world’s largest source of official development finance.³ The United Kingdom has followed suit, redirecting around $7.6 billion in aid funding to defence and national security, resulting in an estimated 40% cut to its global aid program.

Cuts to European aid programs, totalling an estimated $17.2 billion, are scheduled for the remainder of the decade.⁴ These reductions predate the agreement by NATO member states to increase defence and security spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, which could further weigh on future European aid spending. Closer to home and of particular significance to the Pacific is New Zealand’s latest budget, which indicates a 35% reduction in its aid spend by 2027.⁵

Looking ahead — using figures based on current budget documents, outlook statements, public announcements, and credible estimates by other researchers — this report projects some short-term volatility in ODF flows to the Pacific, followed by a period of flatlining (see endnotes for full list of assumptions).⁶ The 11% rise in ODF to the region in 2024 is driven largely by increased disbursements by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which is followed by a 9% contraction in 2025 as US, UK, and European cuts take effect. By 2028, ODF is projected to stabilise at around $3.6 billion annually, well below pandemic-era highs but moderately above the 2015–19 average of $3.2 billion (Figure 5). There is considerable uncertainty around this assessment, though, particularly depending on whether aid cuts are applied uniformly across countries and regions, and whether major Australian budget support loans to Papua New Guinea are sustained.

While the Pacific, like the rest of the globe, has likely passed “peak aid”, its outlook is far more stable than that of other developing regions confronting significant financing shortfalls. That is because ODF to the Pacific is heavily dominated by players that are not cutting their assistance — notably Australia and, to a lesser extent, the multilateral development banks. Australia remains the Pacific’s largest development partner by a wide margin. In 2023, Australia alone accounted for 43% of all ODF to the region. The Asian Development Bank and World Bank combined account for a further 12%. Australia and the two multilateral development banks therefore account for more than half of all ODF to the region.

By contrast, the United States, the United Kingdom, and European donors play a relatively modest role in the Pacific, despite being among the largest global donors. In 2023, the United States contributed just 1% of all ODF to the region, excluding funding to the Compact states, which has largely been shielded from recent aid cuts (see next section). European donors collectively accounted for less than 5% of Pacific ODF, while the United Kingdom contributed only 0.3%. The most consequential aid-reducing donor for the region is New Zealand, which provided around 10% of all ODF in 2023. Overall, the combined aid from these cutting donors amounts to roughly 18% of Pacific ODF. If reductions occur in line with cuts to their global aid budgets, the Pacific will face an estimated $200 million annual shortfall in development support.

Australia’s position as the region’s leading donor is likely to provide an important counterweight to aid cuts by other donors. Total Australian ODF has stabilised at a relatively high baseline of nearly $1.6 billion in 2023 — well above its annual pre-pandemic average of $1.2 billion (Figure 6). In the coming years, Australia’s aid spending is expected to remain flat in inflation-adjusted terms. However, rising infrastructure lending under the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific, which has an AU$2 billion pipeline of projects, should see the total volume of Australian ODF to the region rise modestly.

This stabilisation at a higher post-pandemic baseline, combined with cuts by other Western donors, has driven a stark shift in the Pacific’s bilateral aid landscape. After tracking roughly in line with the aggregate spending of the region’s other bilateral aid partners from 2008–21, the post-pandemic period has seen a clear divergence. As of 2023, Australia provides more than half of bilateral ODF to the region, a share that could rise to around 60% by 2028.

The net effect is a stable but increasingly concentrated aid landscape. While Australia and multilateral development banks remain key pillars of support, the region’s development finance outlook will be heavily reliant on their continued engagement and successful project delivery. Any disruption to Australia’s infrastructure pipeline or multilateral development bank commitments could trigger a sharper decline in ODF, underscoring the fragility of the current equilibrium and Pacific governments’ growing dependence on a narrow set of development partners.

3. Impact of USAID cuts overstated but compounds US reputational freefall

USAID cuts are unlikely to materially affect Pacific Island aid levels, given most US support flows through protected Compacts of Free Association. However, even modest cuts amplify uncertainty and reputational risks, reinforcing perceptions of US inconsistency.

Despite widespread concern, the bulk of US development support to the Pacific is likely to be insulated from Trump administration funding cuts. Around 80% of US aid to the Pacific is directed towards the North Pacific states — Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, and Marshall Islands — through the Compacts of Free Association (Figure 7). Unlike the broader USAID program, these financing flows fall under the US Department of the Interior. This, along with the funding’s link to defence and maritime access agreements, makes both the Compacts and their associated aid financing highly likely to be protected from the wider rollback in US aid spending.

If the Compact of Free Association states are excluded, the United States ranks as only the ninth-largest donor to the Pacific, contributing 1.4% of total aid to the region — just $42 million annually since 2008. Still, there is some important fallout from the cuts, with programs in Melanesian countries appearing most at risk.⁷ There is specific concern around the effects of reduced US health sector support, particularly for current and planned vaccination and HIV programs in Papua New Guinea and Fiji. These cuts are poorly timed, as HIV cases are rising sharply in both countries and the issue has become a matter of significant public and political concern.⁸ In June 2025, Papua New Guinea declared a national HIV crisis.⁹ That said, the cuts may not fully materialise, with some US senators pressing for the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) program to be spared.¹⁰

The aid cuts have also served to further concentrate the Pacific media space, resulting in the closure of the Pacific-focused Radio Free Asia subsidiary BenarNews and leading to an estimated 80% payroll reduction for In-depth Solomons and Inside PNG.¹¹ Against a backdrop of declining media freedom in the region, these reductions are likely to have an outsized impact. The cuts coincide with a significant expansion in Chinese support to Pacific media outlets, particularly through the provision of equipment, facilities, and training.¹²

There are also second-order effects from US staffing cuts and potential reductions in support to multilateral agencies and non-governmental organisations. Although the United Nations accounts for just 1.5% of total aid to the Pacific, it plays an outsized role in vaccinations, food security, and humanitarian assistance. In 2022, the United States contributed more than $18 billion to the United Nations — around a quarter of its total budget. Significant reductions in US support to the United Nations would likely constrain the capacity of key agencies active in the Pacific, including the World Food Programme (50% US-funded), UNAIDS (41%), and UNHCR (36%). The World Health Organisation and GAVI have also seen major shortfalls in US support, both of which run health programs in the region.

Beyond the direct program impacts, the broader consequence of the USAID cuts lies in the reputational damage to the United States. After a decade of promises to Pacific governments and heightened rhetoric about the region’s importance to US foreign policy interests, the rollback of development spending will reinforce perceptions of neglect and unreliability. This plays directly into China’s diplomatic narrative in the Pacific, with Beijing promoting its own South–South cooperation as an alternative.

4. China’s aid model grows more sophisticated with record grants and grassroots projects

After a prolonged decline in lending, China’s development engagement in the Pacific Islands region has stabilised and recalibrated. Funding remains below 2010s levels, but the focus has shifted from debt-driven infrastructure to more targeted, grant-based and grassroots engagement.

In 2023, China provided $230 million in official development finance to the Pacific, a 9% decline from 2022 but broadly consistent with its post-2020 trend (Figure 8). The year-on-year contraction saw China fall behind New Zealand, Japan, and the United States in the 2023 annual spending rankings. However, China’s narrower focus on a smaller set of Pacific countries means it remains the second-largest bilateral donor behind Australia in Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu.

China’s post-pandemic transition to predominantly grant-financed development has accelerated, with preliminary data indicating a record $207 million in grant projects signed in 2024 (Figure 8) and a similar trajectory for the first half of 2025. In inflation-adjusted terms, China’s grant commitments in 2023 were nearly double its $112 million pre-pandemic average. The $135 million China–Fiji Vanua Levu Bridges and Roads Project announced in 2024 stands as China’s largest-ever grant-funded initiative in the Pacific. Record-sized grants were also announced for Tonga and Solomon Islands to finance national stadiums and sporting complexes, and in Vanuatu to fund the construction of a presidential palace and ministerial buildings.

As China has transitioned more of its aid mix towards grants, its engagement has also become smaller in scale and more locally targeted, aligning with Xi Jinping’s push for a “small and beautiful” project approach (Figure 9). Between 2008 and 2019, the median project spend was around $3 million. Since 2020, this figure has dropped to $470,000. This trend is driven by a notable increase in the volume of grassroots and aid-in-kind donations, with China engaging heavily with provincial and local political actors, schools, police forces, and hospitals across the Pacific. China has also maintained its funding to budget support and discretionary funds for select partners, notably the Solomon Islands Constituency Development Fund and Kiribati’s Social Stability Fund. In 2024, China announced a $20 million budget support package to Solomon Islands, indicating continued use of this aid modality.

While the recovery in Chinese engagement since 2020 has been largely grant-driven, loan-financed projects have not disappeared entirely. Since 2022, these have included the $75 million Digital TV Transformation Project in Papua New Guinea (2022), the $66 million Huawei cell tower rollout in Solomon Islands (2022), and in Vanuatu, the $44 million West Ambae Tarseal Road Project (2024) alongside several phases of the Pentecost, Tanna, and Malekula road projects (2021–25). Together, these projects demonstrate that China’s debt-financed infrastructure engagement remains active, albeit more selective.

At the same time, the legacy of China’s earlier loan-heavy approach remains visible. The standard terms of Chinese loans, typically involving a 3–5 year grace period followed by 15–20 years of repayments, mean that many loans issued during the mid-2010s lending boom are now in acute repayment phases. Tonga is facing particularly burdensome debt repayments. China previously allowed Tonga to repeatedly defer debt repayments but without extending the maturity of its loans. This means Tonga must now repay an especially large amount within a short window. Samoa and Vanuatu also face notably large debt repayments to China (Figure 10).

5. Strategic infrastructure spending booms as health and education support slides

Infrastructure has emerged as the Pacific Islands’ dominant development finance theme, driven by acute needs and intensifying geopolitical competition. Yet despite record flows, investment has only marginally narrowed the region’s infrastructure gap and has come at the expense of human development sectors.

Infrastructure has become the fastest-growing area of development finance in the Pacific over the past decade, marking a clear shift in the sectoral focus of external funding to the region. In 2008, infrastructure accounted for just 15% of total official development finance. By 2019, that share had doubled to more than 30%. As of 2023, infrastructure made up more than a quarter of all newly committed financing. What can be broadly categorised as strategic infrastructure — key ports, airports, telecommunications and power generation infrastructure — has become a particular focus of new financing (Figure 11), while support for other infrastructure has been relatively stable.

Two key factors are driving this trend. The first is developmental need. The International Monetary Fund estimates that the Pacific faces an annual infrastructure financing gap of around $1.6 billion, particularly for climate-resilient and hard adaptation investments.¹³ Rising awareness of the region’s acute climate vulnerability has prompted a reallocation of aid towards adaptation and mitigation initiatives, as well as the entrance of dedicated climate players such as the Green Climate Fund. While challenges persist around access and absorptive capacity, these players have injected much-needed resources into the region’s infrastructure landscape.

The second driver is geopolitics. In the mid-2010s, China was the leading provider of loan-financed infrastructure in the Pacific, accounting for more than one-third of total infrastructure funding and more than half when excluding Papua New Guinea. As geopolitical competition has intensified, other donors, particularly Australia, have reoriented their financing towards infrastructure to contest China’s influence in the sector. The shift has been significant: between 2008 and 2018, Australia accounted for just 11% of total infrastructure finance commitments in the region. From 2019 to 2023, that share surged to 65%, driven largely by the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific, which as of 2025 has more than AU$2 billion in signed projects. These dynamics, along with large budget support loans to Papua New Guinea, have seen Australia unseat China as the region’s biggest source of new bilateral debt (Figure 12). This debt can play a helpful role in financing the region’s development where it displaces reliance on more expensive market-rate financing and funds productive investments. However, it also presents some basis for concern given generally elevated debt risks in the Pacific.

Yet this rising investment has not closed the region’s infrastructure gap. Despite the increase in headline figures, annual infrastructure financing flows remain below estimated needs. Moreover, the composition of this financing raises questions of potency. Approximately 40% of infrastructure-tagged ODF in the Pacific is directed towards technical assistance and policy support rather than hard infrastructure delivery.¹⁴ While such spending is important for project preparation and implementation, it suggests the true infrastructure gap may be larger than topline figures imply.

Finally, trade-offs are emerging. The sharp rise in infrastructure spending has coincided with a decline in support for human development sectors, particularly education and health (Figure 13). The data indicates that the infrastructure surge is not fully additional, but has come at the expense of traditional development priorities. In 2023, ODF to education stood at just $216 million, only slightly above the 15-year low recorded in 2019. This relative deprioritisation raises concerns about the long-term foundations for sustainable development and inclusive growth in the region.

Cross-cutting priorities: climate, gender equality, and disability inclusion

Climate development finance

Pacific Island countries are among the most vulnerable globally to the escalating impacts of climate change. Governments across the region face high unmet needs for climate finance, particularly for adaptation. For instance, the International Monetary Fund estimates that Papua New Guinea needs to invest 2% of GDP in adaptation-related infrastructure, while other Pacific Island countries need to invest between 6.5% and 9% of GDP.¹⁵ Given their small economies and deep development challenges, these countries rely heavily on external support to narrow their climate financing gaps.

Trends

Climate-related official development finance (ODF) to the Pacific fell to $1.3 billion in 2023, down from $1.6 billion in 2022 and well below the 2021 peak of nearly $2 billion (Figure 14). This drop largely reflects the unwinding of pandemic-era emergency financing (2020–22) when large budget support loans to Papua New Guinea and Fiji were tagged with climate objectives.

Stripping out these pandemic-related distortions, the longer-term trend is one of steady growth. Climate-related ODF has expanded significantly from a low base, increasing at an average annual rate of about 14%. Importantly, even after the end of large-scale Covid-19 support, the share of ODF allocated to climate finance remained largely consistent. In 2023, the share of climate-tagged ODF stayed above 35%, even as total ODF to the Pacific contracted by 16%.

Breaking down climate-tagged ODF offers some insight into where climate-related financing is directed (Figure 15). The spike in government and civil society sector projects since 2020 reflects the influence of budget support. Strikingly, only 32% of climate-tagged projects fall within the infrastructure sector — and within that, a smaller portion still is directed at “hard” investments in adaptation and mitigation. While data limitations cloud the picture, a considerable share of this financing appears to be directed towards technical assistance, policy advice, and other “soft” adaptation measures.

Key partners

In line with its position as the Pacific’s largest aid donor, Australia has also been the region’s main source of climate-related development finance. Between 2008 and 2023, Australia disbursed $4.3 billion in climate-related ODF to the Pacific — around one-fifth of its total ODF flows to the region (Figure 16). The Asian Development Bank (ADB), meanwhile, has been the leading provider of financing where climate change is listed as a “principal” objective, disbursing $1.1 billion over the same period. This ADB spending accounts for roughly a quarter of all funds directed exclusively towards climate adaptation or mitigation outcomes. While China is the Pacific’s second-largest bilateral donor, its climate financing footprint remains small — totalling $110 million since 2008. The vast majority of this support has been for climate mitigation initiatives, specifically wind energy projects, small-scale solar electrification projects, and grid upgrades.

Climate-focused multilateral agencies such as the Green Climate Fund, Climate Investment Funds, Adaptation Fund, Global Environment Facility, and the Global Green Growth Institute also play a key role in providing “principal” climate finance to Pacific Island countries, as their mandates ensure that almost all funding is directed towards climate objectives. While their overall contribution remains modest, accounting for just 14% of “principal” climate finance to the region between 2008 and 2023, this represents an outsized role given that collectively they provide less than 1% of total ODF to the Pacific.

Gender equality finance

Women in the Pacific Islands face pronounced social and economic inequalities. Across the region, women’s participation in the non-agricultural labour force is roughly half that of men.¹⁶ Two-thirds of women and girls in the Pacific experience gender-based violence.¹⁷ Pacific Island countries also have the lowest level of female political representation in the world, with only 7% of parliamentarians being women, well below the global average of 27%.¹⁸ In response to these trends, international development support has sought to target gender equality outcomes to reduce inequality and promote inclusive development.¹⁹ As of 2023, 29% of ODF projects in the region have a mainstreamed or “significant” focus on gender equality and a further 3% have a “principal” focus on the policy objective.

Trends

Gender-related financing in the Pacific grew steadily in the decade prior to the pandemic, rising at an average rate of 11% per year between 2008 and 2019. On average, “principal” gender-focused projects accounted for $110 million annually, while “significant” gender-focused projects reached $985 million. Over the past 16 years, around 3% of total ODF to the region has had a “principal” focus on gender equality, while an additional 29% of ODF had a “significant” gender focus.

In 2020, both categories of gender ODF saw significant uplift, as major donors such as Australia and Japan embedded gender equality objectives into large Covid-19 budget support programs. This surge temporarily lifted gender-related financing to unprecedented levels (Figure 17). These gains, however, were short-lived as by 2023, gender financing had largely returned to pre-pandemic levels as Covid-19 financial support packages ended and ODF flows returned to 2018–19 levels. The drop in gender financing was therefore predominantly driven by a 27% contraction in “significant” tagged financing, while “principal” financing increased by close to a third to around $150 million.

Breaking down gender-tagged finance flows reveals several trends. First, the growth of governance and civil society projects reflects in part the integration of gender goals into budget support programs, largely accounting for the volatility of this ODF subset since 2020 (Figure 18). Second, infrastructure features prominently in the “significant” gender ODF category, as large projects — particularly those financed by Japan and the ADB — increasingly incorporate gender impact considerations. Finally, gender-tagged ODF to human development sectors has remained relatively stable, reflecting the long-standing integration of gender equality objectives into health and education initiatives, especially those supported by traditional partners such as Australia and New Zealand.

Key partners

In line with its role as the region’s largest ODF provider, Australia also leads the provision of gender-focused ODF (Figure 19). More than 40% of gender-tagged financing that has been disbursed in the Pacific has come from Australia, with Australia’s $110 million Pacific Women Lead program representing the largest “principal” gender investment in the region. In 2023, Australia provided 43% of total ODF to the region, but close to 60% of gender ODF.

The ADB and New Zealand follow Australia as the next-largest providers of gender ODF to the Pacific. The World Bank and EU institutions also play an outsized role, together providing more than one-fifth of all gender-related financing to the region, despite contributing only 5% and 4% of total ODF respectively.

Disability inclusion finance

For the first time, the 2025 Pacific Aid Map includes a dedicated tag and filter to identify development projects that incorporate disability inclusion as an objective. This new feature is based on the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) disability inclusion policy marker. It also includes estimates for other donors who either do not apply the marker or do not report to the OECD.

People with disabilities are among the most marginalised groups in Pacific Island countries, facing persistent stigma, discrimination, and economic exclusion. They experience lower rates of school attendance and labour force participation and are more likely to report negative encounters with health systems.²⁰ Women with disabilities face particularly severe barriers, including higher rates of physical and sexual violence, forced treatments, and earlier childbearing compared with both women without disabilities and men with disabilities.

Trends

The Pacific Disability Forum estimates that 1.7 million people across the region live with a disability.²¹ This number is rising, driven by demographic ageing and the growing prevalence of non-communicable diseases. In response, disability-specific government programs have emerged as a feature of the region’s development landscape. Since 2015, six countries — Fiji, Kiribati, Palau, Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu — have introduced non-contributory disability benefit schemes, providing regular, predictable payments to eligible individuals.²² Yet major gaps remain. Countries such as Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu still lack substantive government support for people with disabilities.

In this context, some development partners have increased efforts to finance disability inclusion and mainstream this into their development activities. While averaging just 0.4% of total ODF before the pandemic (2015–19), disability-related financing rose to 13% of all development finance disbursed in the Pacific in 2023. As seen with climate- and gender-tagged projects, the pandemic period drove a substantial increase in “significant” marked disability financing, with mainstreamed efforts built into budget support programming. Unlike support for other cross-cutting issues, this support has been more durable (Figure 20). Nonetheless, the volume of “principal” disability financing remains very low, averaging less than $4.5 million per year from 2018 to 2022. However, annual financing for these projects jumped from $5.6 million in 2022 to $27 million in 2023 — a more than fourfold increase.

Key partners

Donors have increasingly integrated disability inclusion into broader development initiatives. Australia is the largest provider of disability-related aid in the region, having spent $1.1 billion between 2008 and 2023 (Figure 21). Japan ranks second, having provided $432 million, followed by New Zealand, with $202 million. The vast majority of this financing — close to 98% — has been marked as “significant”, with only $50 million marked as “principal” since 2008. These trends suggest that while there has been some increased focus on disability financing, it remains a more limited policy goal compared to climate- and gender-related development funding.

Methodology

Read the 2025 Pacific Aid Map methodology.